We estimate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension participation among older workers in Norway. The problem of omitted variable bias is addressed using the exposure of an individual's neighbors to plant-downsizing events as an instrument for the disability entry rate among the individual's previously employed neighbors. Our instrumental variable (IV) estimates suggest that an increase of one percentage point in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four-year entry rate of older workers by about 0.4 percentage points. Numerous robustness and specification tests appear to support the validity of the identifying assumption in our IV strategy.
I. Introduction
It is increasingly important for policy-makers to understand the determinants of participation in the disability program. Between 1980 and 1999, the share of non-elderly adults receiving disability benefits in the United States increased by 60 percent to 4.7 percent.
1 Across the OECD as a whole, participation rates in the disability program increased by 36 percent over the period, to 6.4 percent. The dramatic growth of participation rates in the disability program has important implications for national productivity, and for the public financing of disability benefit programs. In 1999, disability benefit payments comprised 1.4 percent of GDP in the US and 2.5 percent of GDP across countries in the European Union.
Notably, the substantial growth in the utilization of disability benefits has occurred without any change in the prevalence of self-reported disabilities (e.g., Cutler and Richardson, 1997; Burkhauser et al., 2001; Duggan and Imberman, 2006) . This suggests that non-health factors have an important role, and there is convincing evidence that economic conditions affect participation in disability programs. Black et al. (2002) have demonstrated that the coal boom and subsequent bust had a large impact on participation in the disability program in US coal-producing states. Autor and Duggan (2003) have found that a decreasing demand for low-skilled workers and increases in their disability benefit replacement rate have led to large increases in participation of the disability program by high-school dropouts. Autor and Duggan (2006) have also cited the increasing real value of Medicaid benefits and the liberalization of the screening process as contributing to the increased utilization of disability benefits in the US. In this paper, we empirically investigate the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability pension (DP) participation in Norway.
3 Specifically, we investigate how a worker's propensity to draw a DP is affected by a plausibly exogenous shock to the disability entry rate of similarly aged workers in the worker's neighborhood. A large and growing empirical body of literature suggests that there is an important role for social interactions in many behavioral outcomes, including teenage childbearing (Crane, 1991) , educational attainment (Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote, 2001; Lalive and Cattaneo, 2005 ) , saving decisions (Duflo and Saez, 2003) , criminal activity (Case and Katz, 1991; Glaeser et al., 1996; Katz, Kling and Liebman, 2001; Ludwig et al., 2001; Kling et al., 2005; Bayer et al., 2009) , and welfare participation among ethnic minorities (Bertrand et al., 2000; Aizer and Currie, 2004) . If social interaction effects exist in the context of disability insurance, this could help to explain the wide variation in disability participation across geographic areas (McCoy et al., 1994) and over time. Moreover, the magnitude of such effects is critical for predicting the impact of policy reforms, demographic changes, and economic shocks on disability participation rates.
Social interaction effects in disability participation could arise from a number of mechanisms (see Section II). For example, social norms against disability participation could impose a utility cost on participants in the form of social stigma (Horan and Austin, 1974; Moffitt, 1983; Lindbeck et al., 1999) . The magnitude of this stigma is expected to decline as disability participation among groups of peers increases, thereby reducing the utility cost of entering a disability program. In this way, social interaction effects give rise to a social multiplier that amplifies the effect of policy changes and economic shocks on aggregate participation rates (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2001; . Any change that directly affects an individual's rate of disability use will have an additional indirect effect through the influence that the individual's participation has on others. 4 It is notoriously difficult to generate credible estimates of social interaction effects from observational data, because of the problems created by omitted variable bias. Peers are likely to be similar in ways that are unobservable in the data (e.g., a propensity for becoming disabled), and they might experience similar contextual environments (e.g., labor-market conditions) that can lead to correlated behaviors across groups of peers, even in the absence of social interaction effects. We address these potential sources of bias by employing a novel instrumental variable (IV) strategy, similar in spirit to the "partial population intervention" approach advocated by Moffitt (2001) . Our strategy hinges on the empirical observation that plant-downsizing events have a substantial effect on disability entry rates (Rege et al., 2009) . Therefore, we use exposure to such events as an instrument for the disability participation rate among a person's previously employed neighbors. The intuition behind this approach is straightforward. If social interaction effects exist, then workers in neighborhoods that are disproportionately exposed to plant-downsizing events should exhibit a relative increase in subsequent disability entry rates, independent of their own experiences in the labor market or changes in the local labor market at large.
Social interaction effects estimated under this IV strategy are consistent, provided that downsizing exposure among a worker's neighbors is uncorrelated with unobservable (individual-level or area-level) determinants of the worker's decision to enter disability. This identifying assumption is potentially problematic because downsizing events concentrated within a particular neighborhood could reflect or cause a decline in local economic opportunities. Alternatively, plant downsizing might be concentrated in neighborhoods populated by people with higher propensities to utilize DP. We use an 11-year panel dataset containing socioeconomic information, employment data, and disability participation records for every person in Norway, and the richness of these data allows us to explore the validity of our identifying assumption.
Our analysis indicates that social interaction effects play an important role in disability participation. Our IV estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four-year entry rate of workers employed at the end of 1999 by roughly 0.4 percentage points. This has important policy implications, suggesting that the direct effect of demographic shifts, policy changes, health shocks, and economic shocks on disability participation understates (by roughly one-third) the full response expected in equilibrium.
II. Social Interaction Effects
The logic of social interaction effects rests on notions of utility interdependence. That is, when a group of peers engages in a particular behavior, this can potentially affect an individual's own utility from engaging in that behavior. In the context of disability participation, this interdependence could operate through at least three channels: social norms, information, and leisure complementarities.
Disability participation is likely to be affected by social norms regarding "appropriate" participation behavior.
5 Coleman (1990) defines a social norm as a rule of behavior that is enforced by social sanctions, which can take the form of stigma. Social interaction effects arise if social norms are conditional in nature (i.e., when the stigma associated with not adhering to a norm is felt more strongly when a group of peers adheres to the norm). For instance, a person with a marginal disability is likely to feel a higher degree of social stigma from drawing disability benefits if surrounded by peers devoted to their work. Thus, as disability participation increases among a group of peers, the incentive to apply for a DP among non-recipients is expected to increase.
There is some empirical evidence that suggests that social norms have an important role in welfare utilization. Although not specific to disability programs, Moffitt (1983) has found evidence for a stigma-related disutility of welfare participation. Horan and Austin (1974) have documented negative self-characterization and lack of self-respect among welfare recipients. Flaa and Pedersen (1999) have reported that 20 percent of welfare program recipients in Norway feel a loss of social approval.
In addition to the stigma associated with social norms against drawing disability, the navigation of the application process might incur a cost in terms of time and frustration. Peers familiar with this process can be a valuable source of information for would-be applicants, reducing the cost of filing an application. This information transfer implies that the cost of applying for disability is lower when more of an individual's peers draw disability.
Alternatively, a person on disability will have more time available for leisure activities than a person engaged in work. Disability participation by a person's peers can increase the value of leisure for that person, making it more attractive to draw disability. Similar to social norms and the information channel, this implies that a person's likelihood of drawing disability increases when participation among his peers increases.
Regardless of the channel through which social interaction effects operate, these effects give rise to a social multiplier-and possibly to multiple equilibria-that amplifies the effect of policy changes, demographic shifts, and health or economic shocks on aggregate participation rates. 6 Any change that directly affects an individual's likelihood of drawing disability will have an additional indirect effect through the influence that the individual's participation has on others. For example, if an economic shock decreases the opportunity cost of drawing disability for a subset of workers, the subsequent increase in disability participation could reduce the stigma associated with drawing disability, thereby increasing participation rates even among those not directly affected by the shock. This self-reinforcing process continues until a new equilibrium is reached.
III. Disability Pension Program in Norway
The Norwegian Disability Pension program 7 serves a similar function as the combined disability programs of Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) in the US. A basic and a supplementary pension provide a benefit that is increasing and concave in prior earnings similar to SSDI, and a special supplement ensures a minimum benefit amount similar to SSI. Even though the Norwegian and US programs have similar formulae for benefits, increasing at a decreasing rate 6 For a formal analysis, see, for example, or Brock and Durlauf (2001) . 7 See Rege et al. (2009) for a more detailed description of the Norwegian DP program. in past earnings, the Norwegian DP program is more generous, providing a higher earnings replacement rate, particularly for low-income workers.
Another important difference between the Norwegian and US programs is that the Norwegian program allows workers to apply for a DP while still employed. As a result, it is common for Norwegian workers to receive "sick money" prior to transitioning from employment on to disability without ever being unemployed. Sick money refers to temporary assistance (up to one year) provided to disabled workers, ensuring benefits equal to 100 percent of earnings up to some maximum level. After one year, workers can draw a somewhat smaller rehabilitation pension until returning to work or entering the disability program. During the first 12 months of sick absenteeism, when the worker is typically covered by sick money, Norwegian law makes it particularly difficult to formally dismiss sick workers. Therefore, unlike the US, it is not uncommon for disability entrants to enter directly from employment.
IV. Empirical Strategy

Fundamental Challenges
It is notoriously difficult to identify social interaction effects in observational data. An immediate problem is to determine an appropriate definition for peer groups. Defining peer groups from existing data sources is always somewhat arbitrary. Ideally, it would be preferable to identify individuals with whom a given worker interacts. Lacking such data, peer groups are commonly defined by geographic proximity and/or by characteristics suggestive of "social proximity" (e.g., similar socioeconomic or employment characteristics). In this paper, peer groups are defined as workers of a similar age residing in the same neighborhood.
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A more vexing problem is the econometric challenge of producing plausibly unbiased estimates of peer effects, given potential sources of bias arising from individual-level or environmental determinants of disbility participation. To demonstrate, consider a straightforward empirical model intended to estimate the contemporaneous effect of the disability participation rate of peers on an individual's own probability of utilizing disability, illustrated 8 Norwegian neighborhoods are sufficiently small that it is reasonable to believe workers within a given neighborhood do, in fact, interact with one another. In 1995, there were 14,211 geographically defined neighborhoods (grunnkrets). On average, an individual lives in a neighborhood with 614 native citizens. The mean neighborhood size in our analytical sample is 693, with the difference resulting from our exclusion of workers in the smallest neighborhoods. A consequence of our definition of peer groups is that groups vary in size. While a definition of equally sized peer groups would have been preferable, estimates were not meaningfully affected if workers in the smallest (or largest) peer groups were excluded.
here in the form of a linear probability model:
Here, DPy i is an indicator that person i draws a DP in year y, PeerDPy i is the participation rate among i's peers in year y, X i is a vector of exogenous characteristics of person i, P i is a vector of exogenous characteristics of i's peer group, and ε i is an error term with mean zero.
The parameter of interest in equation (1) is φ, which is intended to capture the effect of the disability participation of i's peers on i's likelihood of drawing a DP. Provided the peer participation rate is independent of the unobserved determinants of participation, an estimation of equation (1) provides an unbiased estimate of φ. Assuming that φ is unbiased, 1/(1-φ) provides an estimate of the social multiplier .
The plausibility of the identifying assumption in the contemporaneous model is undermined by the reflection problem discussed by Manski (1993 Manski ( , 1995 . In the context of disability participation, there are two reasons why we might expect a positive within-neighborhood correlation of disability entry behavior, even in the absence of social interaction effects. First, individuals self-select into neighborhoods, so neighbors are potentially similar in their probability of becoming disabled or their distaste for work, causing what Manski calls correlated effects. Second, workers within a given neighborhood are exposed to similar environmental determinants of disability participation, causing what Manski refers to as exogenous (or contextual) effects. These determinants could include variation in local-market conditions, in area-specific health risks, or in the stringency of the DP screening process. While the inclusion of a rich set of individual-, peer-, and arealevel covariates can reduce the biases arising from correlated and contextual effects, there are limits to the extent such characteristics can be appropriately included in the contemporaneous model. Characteristics pertaining to income, work history, and even marital status are some of the characteristics that probably should not be controlled for, because each is likely to be endogenous with disability participation. Notably, the random assignment of people to neighborhoods would alleviate only the self-selection bias problem, not biases arising from contextual effects. This highlights the difficulty in generating plausible estimates of social interaction effects in a contemporaneous framework.
Instrumental Variable Approach
Our approach for addressing these potential sources of bias is to exploit recent and plausibly exogenous shocks that affect disability participation. Our strategy specifically uses exposure to plant-downsizing events to instrument for the disability participation rate of previously employed Rege et al., (2009). 9 Second, disability participation is "sticky", in the sense that participants rarely exit the system (i.e., less than 1 percent per year 10 ). As a result, neighbors' exposure to plant downsizing affects their subsequent rate of disability utilization, and this effect persists over time, even in the absence of social interaction effects.
The logic underlying our IV strategy is straightforward. The exposure of peers to plant-downsizing events affects their disability participation rate at a later date. For workers still employed at that later date, we investigate whether downsizing-induced variation in the disability participation rate of peers contributes to a variation in subsequent disability entry. Provided that the recent exposure of a group of peers to plant-downsizing events is independent of unobserved (individual and environmental) determinants of subsequent disability entry, the sources of positive bias discussed above would be alleviated. Figure 1 provides a visual depiction of the time frame of our analysis. Operationally, we implement a two-stage linear probability model (2SLS).
11 The first-stage equation predicts the disability participation rate among i's peers at the end of 2000:
Here, PeerDP2000 i is the participation rate among i's peers in year 2000, X i is a vector of the characteristics of worker i in 1999, 13 P i is a vector of the characteristics of i's peer group in 1995, N i is a vector of the area-level characteristics of i's neighborhood, municipality, and economic region in 1995, PeerDS i is a vector characterizing the exposure of i's peers to plantdownsizing events between 1995 and 1999, and v i is an error term with mean zero.
The second-stage equation determines the likelihood that a worker who is employed in 1999 draws disability in 2003:
Here, Peer D P2000 i is the predicted disability participation rate of peers from an estimation of the first-stage equation.
Under the assumption that the exposure of peers to downsizing events is independent of unobserved (individual-level and area-level) determinants of disability entry, the 2SLS will provide a consistent estimation of α 4 . There are several reasons why the assumption of independence might be problematic. First, the exposure of peers to downsizing could be correlated with a worker's own plant-downsizing experience, either in the past or in the future We also address this concern through robustness tests, by investigating whether our estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of covariates that capture a worker's past (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) and future (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) exposure to plant downsizing. Second, local plant-downsizing events might be correlated with a decline in economic opportunities or future-earnings prospects, even for individuals in non-downsizing plants. Therefore, we test whether our estimate is sensitive to the inclusion of variables meant to proxy for such things, such as changes in the area unemployment rate and changes in individual earnings over the period 1995-1999. Finally, plant downsizing might be concentrated in neighborhoods that are populated by people who have higher unobserved propensities to draw sickness-related benefits. If so, we would expect the downsizing rates of peers to be correlated with rates of sick money and DP use prior to 1995. The richness of our data allows us to test this possibility as well.
Interpreting the Social Interaction Coefficient
As our notation suggests, the parameter α 4 in equation (3) is not precisely analogous to the parameter φ in the contemporaneous model of social interactions (equation (1)). The difference lies in the fact that α 4 is identified in the context of an entry hazard framework: estimates of α 4 capture the predictive effect of variation in period 1 peer group DP entry rates on entry rates in the subsequent period.
14 In contrast, the parameter φ in the contemporaneous model is presumed to capture the magnitude of social interaction effects in equilibrium.
Our IV approach provides a policy-relevant interpretation of the estimated social interaction coefficient α 4 in terms of the social multiplier, but only under restrictive assumptions regarding the lag-time between the direct effect of peer exposure to downsizing and the subsequent social interaction effect. To see this, suppose a fraction A of a peer group is induced to enter a disability program as result of recent individual or environmental events. Our estimate of α 4 suggests that another α 4 A(1-A) share of the peer group will subsequently enter a disability program as a result of social interaction effects. Thus, the total effect of the recent shock is an increase in the disability participation rate within the group A+α 4 A(1-A), which implies a social multiplier of magnitude 1+α 4 (1-A). However, the appropriateness of this inference depends on the assumption that the social interaction effects arising from the exposure to downsizing of peers fully emerge during the period (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) over which we analyze the disability entry of workers. If part of the social interaction effect emerges prior to this period, our inferred social multiplier will understate the true social multiplier. Similarly, the time required for peer group participation rates to equilibrate from past disability-inducing shocks could extend beyond this period, which would also bias our estimate for the social multiplier downwards. As such, we view 1+α 4 (1-A) as producing a lower bound estimate of the social multiplier (under the assumption, of course, that the exposure of peers to downsizing events influences an individual's entry to a disability program only through its effect on the disability entry of peers).
V. Description of the Dataset
Our analysis utilizes a database maintained by Statistics Norway called FD-trygd, which provides us with a rich longitudinal dataset containing records for every Norwegian from 1992 to 2003. The variables captured in this dataset include individual demographic information (sex, age, marital status, number of children), socioeconomic data (years of education, income, wealth), current employment status (full-time, part-time, minor part-time, self-employed), industry of employment (if employed), indicators of participation in any of Norway's welfare programs, and geographic identifiers to the level of neighborhood of residence.
In addition, FD-trygd contains records for employment "events" since mid-1995. These events, captured by individual and date, include entry and exits into employment, changes in employment status (full-time, part-time, minor part-time), and changes in plant and firm of employment. These employment events are constructed by data analysts at Statistics Norway from raw employment spell records submitted by employers, and verified against employee wage records (not available to us) to ensure the validity of each spell, and to eliminate records pertaining to "secondary" employment spells.
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From these two data sources, four set of variables have been created for use in our analysis, as described below. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for select variables. Table A1 in Appendix A of the on-line appendices presents a detailed list and description of all covariates used in our empirical models.
Plant-Downsizing Variables
Based on the employment records, we have constructed plant-level employment counts at the end of years 1995, 1999, and 2003 . The counts were constructed as measures of full-time equivalents (FTEs), with part-time and minor part-time employment measured as 0.67 and 0.33 FTEs, respectively. We excluded from these counts any persons identified as self-employed or receiving assistance that should have precluded full-time work (unemployment benefits, rehabilitation, or a DP). Plant-level FTEs were then used to construct measures of plant downsizing rates (PDR) over two periods of time: from 1995 to 1999 and from 1999 to 2003. From these measures, we have identified plants that downsized 10-25, 25-50, and 50-100 percent over each period.
Because our empirical strategy relies on the power of plant-downsizing events to predict subsequent entry to a disability program, we have chosen to focus on downsizing events in reasonably large plants. Specifically, the PDR variable was set to zero for workers employed in plants with fewer 
Worker Sample and Characteristics
Our analytical sample consists of native Norwegians aged between 45 and 63, employed either full-time or part-time in 1999, and also employed full-time or part-time in 1995, with a history of earnings over 1993-1995 that indicates consistent attachment to the workforce. 17 We have chosen to focus on older workers, because they demonstrate the highest rates of entry to a disability program. 18 The upper age limit was imposed to ensure that no-one in our sample would be eligible for the normal retirement pension in 2003. 19 We excluded any workers identified as self-employed or receiving assistance that is incompatible with a close attachment to the labor force (unemployment benefits, rehabilitation, a DP, or social assistance), as well as any workers with past disability participation. We excluded those employed in small plants (< five FTEs) in 1999, for the purpose of controlling for a worker's own exposure to plant downsizing in the future (over 1999-2003) . We also limited our sample to those residing in a neighborhood in 1995 that contained at least 10 workers aged 41-62, in order to ensure that each person in our sample had a reasonable number of "peers" corresponding to our definition of peer groups. Finally, one worker was omitted because of missing income/wealth variables in 1999. The resulting dataset consists of 373,076 workers residing in 10,140 different neighborhoods in 1995.
Variables that capture individual socioeconomic characteristics were constructed based on records for 1999. These variables include age, sex, education, marital status, number of children, earnings, total household income, net household wealth, and an indicator for receipt of a widow(er) pension. Employment-related variables include an indicator for part-time status, tenure at current firm, plant size in 1999, and 14 industry indicators.
20 Downsizing in the worker 's plant in 1999 (1999-2003) was captured, as well as the past downsizing exposure (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) based on the worker's plant of employment in 1995. For the purposes of controlling for a worker's own exposure to plant-downsizing events, individual downsizing covariates were constructed as 42 dummy covariates based on the worker's industry and the magnitude of downsizing (10-25, 25-50, or 50-100 percent) occurring at their plant over the specified period. Earnings, household 17 For example, in 1995, a worker had to earn 56,000 NOK (8,850 US$). These are the minimum earnings required to receive additional earnings-related pension rights in the Norwegian pension system. 18 Modifying the age criteria had minimal effects on our estimates. For instance, if the workers in the youngest quartile of peer groups were excluded (based on median peer age), estimates were 10 percent smaller. If workers in the oldest quartile of peer group were excluded, estimates were 1 percent smaller. 19 The age of eligibility for the normal retirement pension is 67. 20 These are coded based on major categories in the Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community (NACE), with certain categories combined because of small sample sizes (agriculture, hunting, and forestry was combined with fishing; the activities of households was combined with other community, social, and personal service activities; extraterritorial organizations and bodies was combined with public administration and defense).
income, and household wealth were also captured for 1995, allowing us to control for changes in the worker's economic standing.
Our outcome of interest is an indicator variable capturing whether the worker received a DP at the end of 2003. 21 In total, 6.9 percent of our sample of workers received a DP by then.
Peer Groups and Characteristics
As described in our empirical strategy, we define peer groups based on age, neighborhood of residence (at the end of 1995), and employment status. Specifically, neighbors are included in a worker's peer group if they are aged 41-62, employed full-time or part-time in 1995, with a history of earnings during 1993-1995 that indicate consistent attachment to the workforce. The upper age limit was imposed to ensure that peers were not eligible for the normal retirement pension in 2000. We have defined peer groups based on the neighborhoods of residence in 1995, in case downsizing events influenced worker mobility.
Similar socioeconomic and employment variables as those described for the worker sample were constructed at the peer group level, using records for 1995. Continuous variables were converted to categorical variables to create the peer-level covariates used in our estimation models. For instance, the age and sex composition of a worker's peers was captured as the fraction of peers in 14 age−sex categories (three-year age intervals interacted with sex). The income and wealth of peers were each captured as the fraction of peers in six categories based on the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles for the distribution of the relevant variable over the full sample of peers. Additional variables of program participation were created for the fraction of peers on social assistance, for those receiving sick money at the end of 1995, or for those having received sick money at any time in 1995. The industry of employment of peers was captured as the fraction in 14 industry categories.
The exposure of peers to downsizing events was captured as the fraction of peers exposed to a major downsizing event in each of the 14 industries, where major downsizing is defined as a reduction in employment of more than 50 percent, measured in FTEs.
22 21 Throughout, for workers (or peers) who died or emigrated prior to 2003 and those drawing an early retirement pension in 2003 (in some firms, workers satisfying specific work history requirements can qualify for an early retirement pension at age 62), the indicator was set to one if the worker (peer) received a DP prior to the event occurring. 22 Rege et al. (2009) have found that the direct effect of plant downsizing on individual entry to a disability program varies substantially by industry, which suggests that the direct effects of employment shocks are heterogeneous across different types of workers. Varying the downsizing threshold for identifying "major" downsizing events (e.g., to 40, 60, or 70 Finally, the disability participation rate of each worker's peers was constructed as the fraction of peers on disability in 2000. Over our sample of workers, the mean participation rate of the workers' peer groups was 7.4 percent in 2000.
Area-Level Characteristics
We have created additional variables to capture the characteristics of the neighborhood, municipality, and economic region 23 of residence in 1995, which could potentially capture (or proxy for) the environmental determinants of entry to a disability program. At each level, the measures of mean income, mean wealth, and the unemployment rate were calculated.
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Analogous measures were constructed at each level for 1999, allowing us to control (in robustness checks) for changes in these important contextual factors. Additionally, at the neighborhood and municipality level, we calculated (in 1995) the total native population, the fraction of immigrants, the fraction of natives aged <18, 18-41, and ≥62 years old, the fraction receiving a DP, and the fraction employed part-time or full-time.
VI. Empirical Results
First-Stage Results
Our IV strategy hinges on the fact that plant-downsizing events affect individual entry to a disability program, so that the exposure of peers to downsizing (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) can be used to predict the disability entry rate of a worker's peers (to 2000). Column 1 of Table 2 gives the linear (OLS) estimates of the effect of the exposure of peers to major downsizing events on the peer disability participation rate in 2000 for workers in our sample (i.e., our first-stage model, equation (2)). Covariates that capture individual (1999), peer (1995), and area (1995) characteristics are included in this and all subsequent models. While the estimated peer downsizing coefficients are generally positive, there is substantial variation in the magnitude and precision of these estimates. The aggregate predictive power of the percent) had little effect on our estimates, although higher thresholds reduced the estimated precision. 23 These are geographically defined areas. There are more than 14,000 neighborhoods and about 435 municipalities. The 89 economic regions are defined by Statistics Norway to represent distinct regional labor markets. 24 The income, wealth, and unemployment rate variables were calculated over natives aged 22-67. To calculate the unemployment rate, the employed were counted as those working full-time or part-time, and the unemployed were counted as those neither working nor selfemployed, and having received unemployment benefits or registered as "looking for work" in the past year. peer downsizing covariates is quite low, producing an F-statistic of 3.11. As a result, the inclusion of the full set of peer downsizing covariates in the instrument set raises a well-known set of weak-instrument problems. 25 First, IV estimates based on the full set of potential instruments are expected to suffer from finite-sample bias towards the OLS estimate. Second, the asymptotic assumptions, which are intrinsic to conventional hypothesis testing, break down in the face of weak instruments. This means that conventional standard errors exaggerate the precision of IV estimates. Third, if the instruments are not entirely exogenous, the expected bias is more severe when instruments are weak. Thus, potential violations of the identifying assumption are of greater concern when instruments are weak.
Social interaction effects in disability pension participation 1225
While asymptotic efficiency is obtained from including all valid instruments, the finite-sample properties of IV estimates can be improved by selectively excluding valid instruments with weak power (Stock et al., 2002) . A number of procedures for instrument selection have been suggested in the econometrics literature as a way of addressing the weak-instrument problem (e.g., Donald and Newey, 2001; Hall and Peixe, 2003) , although a standard method has yet to emerge.
To address our weak-instrument problem, we adopted a procedure to select among the set of potential instruments along the lines suggested by Donald and Newey (2001) . Specifically, we re-estimated the first-stage model incrementally, excluding peer downsizing covariates that contribute the least predictive power (as measured by the partial R 2 ). Column 2 of Table 2 gives the first-stage estimates using the 10 peer downsizing covariates that contribute the greatest predictive power, while Columns 3-6 successively exclude the weakest remaining covariate. The exclusion of weaker instruments can be seen to have only a modest effect on the partial R 2 of the model, while the F-statistic improves. The results from these alternative models were used to calculate the approximate finite-sample bias in the 2SLS estimator and the asymptotic variance around the estimator, from which the approximate mean square error was calculated. The formulae for doing so are presented in Appendix C of the on-line appendices. As seen in Table 2 , the approximate bias is negative across specifications, indicating a finite-sample bias in IV estimation (towards smaller OLS estimates) that decreases in magnitude with the exclusion of weaker instruments. The mean square error is minimized in the model including the seven instruments with greatest predictive power (Column 5), which we then utilize as our preferred set of instruments in the analyses that follow. Unfortunately, the F-statistic remains somewhat low (5.73) in this specification, which indicates that our IV estimates are still expected to suffer (modest) finitesample bias towards the OLS estimate, and conventional standard errors potentially understate the true variance around these estimates.
Column 7 of Table 2 gives the results under a more parsimonious specification of the first-stage model, using as the sole instrument the fraction of peers in major downsizing plants (irrespective of industry). Importantly, the partial R 2 is only a quarter as large as under our preferred specification of instrument. This indicates that IV estimates under this parsimonious specification would suffer substantially greater imprecision, and the expected degree of finite-sample bias is more than twice as large. Table 3 presents the main results from our analysis. For comparison purposes, the first two columns report non-IV estimates of the social interaction effect. Estimated under a linear probability specification via OLS (Column 1), our estimate suggests a 1 percent increase in the 2000 peer disability participation rate predicts a modest 0.07 percentage point increase in the subsequent entry rate (to 2003) of workers employed at the end of 1999. A probit specification produced an estimated mean marginal effect about 20 percent smaller.
Main Results
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Columns 3-6 provide various IV estimates of α 4 using our preferred instrument set. The 2SLS suggests that a one percentage point increase in the 2000 peer disability participation rate due to recent downsizing events increases the subsequent entry rate (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) of workers by about 0.37 percentage points, a 5.4 percent increase relative to the aggregate entry rate. Estimating our IV model using a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 27 method had little effect on our estimate (see Column 4), as did estimation using a two-step feasible generalized method of moments (results not shown). Employing the bias-corrected 2SLS model of Nagar (1959) , the estimated α 4 increases to 0.42, which is consistent with the approximate bias estimate in Table 2 (Column 5). In an IV−probit specification, the estimated mean marginal effect is about 10 percent smaller than suggested by the linear models.
Columns 7 and 8 in Table 3 report the 2SLS and IV−probit estimates of α 4 using the full set of peer downsizing covariates as instruments, while Columns 9 and 10 utilize the single instrument (i.e., the fraction of peers 26 In Appendix B of the on-line appendices, we demonstrate why non-IV estimates of α 4 are almost certainly useless for inferring the magnitude of social interactions effects. None the less, the non-IV estimates establish a benchmark for evaluating the impact of finite-sample bias on our IV estimates. 27 LIML estimators are known to be less biased than 2SLS but they suffer from larger small sample variation (Hahn et al., 2004) . Conventional robust standard errors are in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals within neighborhoods. * * * , * * , and exposed to major downsizing, irrespective of industry). In both cases, the approximate bias estimates in Table 2 (Columns 1 and 7) would lead us to anticipate modestly smaller estimates in these specifications. Instead, the estimates under the full instrument set are slightly larger than our preferred estimates. Estimates using the single instrument are 23 percent smaller, but they are within half a standard error of our preferred estimate, and much less precisely estimated (as anticipated).
As mentioned earlier, the conventional standard errors reported for our IV estimates should be interpreted with caution because they potentially overstate the precision of our estimates as a result of the weakness of our instruments. To evaluate the extent of this problem, we have compared the conventional confidence interval around our 2SLS estimate to that calculated using the conditional likelihood ratio approach developed by Moreira (2003) . 28 There was very little difference between the two confidence intervals when evaluated at either the 95 or 99 percent levels. This suggests that the conventional standard errors provide a reasonably accurate gauge of estimate precision.
As discussed previously, IV estimates of α 4 can be used to infer the magnitude of the social multiplier under the assumption that social interaction effects arising from downsizing events in 1995-1999 are entirely captured during the period 1999-2003. Our estimates imply a social multiplier in the range of 1.31 under the IV−probit specification to 1.39 under the biascorrected 2SLS specification (see Table 3 ). In contrast, the estimation of a contemporaneous model of social interaction effects (see equation (1)) produced estimates of φ=0.58, implying a multiplier of 2.38. 29 The large difference is consistent with an upwards bias in the non-IV contemporaneous model of social interaction effects, and with the fact that our inference for the social multiplier is appropriately viewed as a lower bound.
Robustness Tests
The identifying assumption in our IV approach is that the plant-downsizing experiences of a worker's peers occur independently of unobserved determinants of disability participation. Table 4 presents the results of robustness checks to test the validity of this assumption, with 2SLS and IV−probit estimates. For comparison, the results from our baseline specifications are repeated in Column 1. 28 For the purposes of this comparison, the model was estimated under the assumption of independent, homoskedastic errors. As currently available in Stata , the conditional likelihood ratio test statistics can only be calculated under this assumption. Murray (2006) cites the approach of Moreira as "state of the art for hypothesis testing with weak instruments" (p. 126). 29 The details are presented in Appendix D of the on-line appendices. An important concern for our identifying assumption is that exposure to downsizing is correlated across peers, who are frequently employed in the same plants. As a result, our IV estimate could reflect a delayed reaction to a worker's own downsizing experience. Thus, in Column 2, we add additional controls for past downsizing events (over 1995-1999) in the workers' plants in 1995. The exposure of peers to downsizing could also increase a worker's likelihood of future exposure to downsizing, which we control for in Column 3. While our baseline model contains rich controls for the worker's earnings and wealth in 1999, the trajectory of earnings (and wealth) could be impeded in areas that experience more job loss, contributing to higher subsequent rates of entry into a disability program. Therefore, in Column 4, we control for changes in workers' earnings, total household income, and household wealth between 1995 and 1999. While each additional set of covariates contributed significantly to the fit of the model (p < 0.0001 in all cases), these inclusions had little effect on our estimate, increasing it modestly.
In Columns 5 and 6, we address the concern that our measure of downsizing is a fairly crude measure of the exposure of individual workers to employment shocks. Workers who switched plants during 1995-1999 are a particular concern in this regard, because they might have been exposed to downsizing in their subsequent plants, or they might have been laid off from a plant that subsequently increased employment. Thus, in Column 5, we exclude workers who switched plants, while Column 6 is restricted to nonswitchers in stable or growing plants during 1995-1999. 30 We perceive this last model as a particularly strong test of social interaction effects, because the sample excludes all workers directly exposed to downsizing events. 31 Again, the IV estimates are modestly larger.
A final concern about bias arises from the fact that disproportionate exposure of peers to plant-downsizing events could indicate weakening job-market opportunities in the local area, which could induce higher entry rates to the disability program, even among workers not directly affected by plant downsizing. Thus, in Column 7, we include covariates for the unemployment rate, mean income, and mean wealth of the worker's neighborhood, municipality, and region in 1999. Again, the inclusion of these covariates contributes significantly to the fit of the second-stage model (p < 0.0001), but this has the effect of modestly increasing our estimate.
We also tested the robustness of our estimates to more parsimonious sets of covariates in order to capture individual-, peer group-, and arealevel characteristics; the results are presented in Appendix E of the on-line 30 We have omitted the results for these IV−probit specifications, which did not converge using these smaller samples. 31 This specification most closely resembles the partial population intervention approach advocated by Moffitt (2001). appendices. Along each of these individual dimensions, we find that the inclusion of more parsimonious controls has little effect on our estimate. Under a fully parsimonious specification, the estimate is modestly smaller. This argues against the likelihood that omitted variables bias our estimates upwards, because the inclusion of richer controls produces estimates that are larger, not smaller.
Taken together, these results give little indication that increased entry to the disability program among workers with peers disproportionately exposed to downsizing reflects the effect of adverse employment experiences or inferior local labor-market conditions.
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Specification Tests
In this section, we explore the possibility that variation in pre-existing unobservables is correlated with the variation in PeerDP2000 i explained by our instruments. Primarily, we have two unobservables in mind, which can be labeled "propensity for work" and "propensity for drawing disability-related benefits". For instance, if workers with peers disproportionately exposed to downsizing have lower propensities for work, this could bias IV estimates of the social interaction effect upwards. A number of plausible stories could lead to such a bias. Downsizing events might be concentrated in areas with generally poorer employment opportunities or in areas where attachment to the labor force is generally weaker. Alternatively, because workers sort themselves into neighborhoods for reasons unobserved, workers with weaker attachment to the labor force might self-select neighborhoods where plant-employment patterns are less stable. Similar stories could be told that would lead to a correlation between the explained variation in PeerDP2000 i and the unobserved propensity for drawing disability-related benefits. Table 5 (Panel A) reports the 2SLS estimates of the effect of PeerDP2000 i on the probability that a worker in our sample is employed full-time or part-time at the end of each calendar year. In Panel B, we report analogous estimates for the probability that a worker receives sick money at the end of each year. 33 The results in Panel A, while generally insignificant, suggest modestly stronger labor force attachment among workers with peers disproportionately exposed to major downsizing, with no strong indication that this changes even after 1999. Indeed, the largest point estimate is observed in 2003. Panel B generally shows a negative (usually 32 We also tested the robustness of our estimates to exclusion of younger or older peer groups. The estimates are nearly identical if we exclude the quarter of workers with a median-aged peer greater than 53, and they decline by 8 percent if we exclude the quarter of workers with a median-aged peer less than 44. 33 IV−probit estimates (not reported) were usually smaller (but of comparable magnitude) and less significant. insignificant) correlation between the use of sick money and downsizinginduced changes in PeerDP2000 i prior to 1999. After 1999, there is some indication that the exposure of peers increases the use of sick money, although the relationship is only significant in 2001 (and the estimate in 2002 is actually negative). Overall, these results provide little support for the argument that our estimated social interaction effects are biased upwards by pre-existing differences in labor force attachment or propensities to draw sickness-related benefits. If anything, these results might lead us to expect that our IV estimates suffer from a modest negative bias. Pre-existing variation in employment and the use of sick money in our sample of workers is constrained by the fact that our sample is limited to workers who meet the employment criteria for inclusion. Therefore, we also test whether neighborhood rates of disability participation and employment prior to 1995 are correlated with downsizing-induced changes in PeerDP2000 i , excluding all neighborhood-level covariates from our model. Table 6 reports these results. We find little evidence that the differential exposure of peer groups to downsizing is associated with neighborhood employment or disability participation rates. Downsizing-induced changes in PeerDP2000 i are associated with slightly higher neighborhood disability participation rates and employment rates, but they never approach statistical significance.
As an additional specification test, we have also produced estimates that exclude the 11 percent of workers who resided in their 1995 neighborhood for fewer than four years. Assuming that the strength of social ties to neighbors increases over time, we would expect the estimated social interaction effect to be larger when estimated over this subsample. Consistent with this, our 2SLS estimate increased by 24 percent to 0.478 and it achieved statistical significance at the 1 percent level. Estimates were also modestly larger if we excluded peer groups from neighborhoods with higher turnover rates.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we have estimated the magnitude of social interaction effects in disability participation among older workers in Norway. Specifically, we have investigated how the propensity of workers to draw disability benefits is affected by the disability participation of their peers, defined as neighbors of similar age and employment status. To address issues of omitted variable bias, we use the exposure of peers to major plant-downsizing events to instrument for peer rates of entry to the disability program. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine social interaction effects in disability participation.
Our IV estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the disability participation rate of previously employed neighbors increased the subsequent four-year entry rate of employed workers by 0.34 to 0.42 percentage points, with modestly smaller effect estimates in non-linear (IV−probit) specifications and larger estimates correcting for finite-sample bias.
The causal interpretation of our social interaction estimate depends critically on the assumption that the exposure of peers to downsizing events is independent of unobserved determinants of disability entry. Ex ante, we might reasonably expect downsizing events to be concentrated in neighborhoods populated by workers with higher pre-existing propensities for entering the disability program. However, we find no evidence that the variance in peer disability participation rates induced by the exposure of peers to plant-downsizing events is associated with the neighborhood rate of DP use prior to the relevant downsizing events. Workers in peer groups disproportionately exposed to downsizing have higher rates of employment and lower rates of sick-money use prior to the downsizing events. If anything, this suggests a higher propensity towards work and a lower propensity for drawing sickness-related benefits.
Alternatively, local downsizing events could adversely affect local labormarket conditions, causing a rise in disability entry rates independent of any social interaction effect. Our empirical strategy cannot entirely rule out biases arising from changing environmental conditions, although our estimates are robust to measurable changes in local economic conditions. This undermines the argument that environmental conditions represent a serious source of bias.
Our findings suggest that 1.3 represents a lower bound estimate for the social multiplier in disability participation when measured at the level of Norwegian neighborhoods. As demonstrated in , the level of aggregation can greatly affect the size of estimated social multipliers. Norway has a particularly homogeneous population, which could contribute to especially large social interaction effects. None the less, our results suggest a social multiplier that is similar in magnitude to those estimated by in college dorm rates of fraternity membership and county-level (US) crime rates.
A social interaction effect of this magnitude (or larger) has important implications for research in disability insurance participation. Social interaction effects could conceivably explain the large variation in SSDI participation across US counties (McCoy et al., 1994) . They could conceivably contribute to the sizable labor supply response to disability benefit increases observed in Canada (Gruber, 2000) , as well as the large SSDI response to the coal boom/bust observed in coal-producing states (Black et al., 2002) . To the extent that social networks are defined along socioeconomic lines, they could help to explain the large increase in disability participation among low-skilled US workers, attributed by Autor and Duggan (2003) to the declining demand for low-skilled workers and an unforeseen increase in their disability benefit replacement rates. As a general empirical matter, the existence of large social interaction effects requires careful interpretation of estimates meant to capture the individual-level determinants of disability participation, to the extent these determinants are concentrated within particular social networks. Such estimates are likely to exaggerate the individual-level importance of such determinants while understating the full (aggregate) effect.
For policy-makers, our results lend empirical support to concerns about the potential development of welfare cultures arising from poorly designed disability insurance programs. From a social welfare perspective, the existence of large social interaction effects could dramatically affect the socially optimal replacement rate in social insurance programs, an issue that has received little attention in the body of literature on program design.
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The existence of social interaction effects would also strengthen arguments made by Autor and Duggan (2006) regarding the importance of developing screening procedures that better identify the individuals meant to be covered by disability insurance programs. Finally, our results indicate that efforts to reduce the impact of economic shocks on disability entry (e.g., retraining programs, job search assistance) would, if effective, also reduce disability participation among workers not directly affected by those shocks.
34 Kroft (2008) is a notable exception.
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